Myanmar Military’s Conscription Law: A Historical Perspective

 

Myanmar  Military’s Conscription Law:  A  Historical Perspective

By Nyo Htun

From the revered era of the Three Heroes of the Burmese Independence Army to modern times, the Myanmar Armed Forces, or Tatmadaw, has long been celebrated for its glory. However, under the leadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the institution has faced unprecedented disgrace and criticism.

Following the country’s independence, the Tatmadaw earned renown by dismantling the Communist Party of Burma, expelling Chinese Kuomintang invaders, and safeguarding the Rangoon government during the 1950s. However, these glorious days are now a distant memory, with international observers increasingly critical of the current state of the armed forces.

In the aftermath of the chaotic 2021 Spring Revolution, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing introduced a policy mandating civilian military service. This initiative marked a significant departure from the Tatmadaw’s traditional methods and raised questions about its effectiveness and ethical implications.

To understand this policy, one must examine the history of Myanmar's military conscription laws. During the independence struggle, the Anti0Fascist People's Freedom (AFPFL), known as the General Headquarters of the Freedom Bloc, split in 1958 into two factions: the AFPFL(ThantShin)" led by U Nu and the "AFPFL(TiMyae)" led by Ne Win. Amid political turmoil, Prime Minister U Nu handed power to General Ne Win, leading to the establishment of a "caretaker government" by the military, an event some described as a de facto coup.

Under Ne Win's leadership, the Tatmadaw formalized its control over the three branches of power. In 1959, the "People’s Military Service Law" was enacted. According to former Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung's writings in the Caretaker Government chronicle, this marked the inception of conscription laws in Myanmar, which have now been in effect for 64 years.

This legislation, reportedly inspired by Israel’s national defense strategy, was drafted by Brigadier Generals Maung Maung and Aung Gyi. At the time, Israel mandated military service for men aged 20 and older, with provisions for reservists up to 60 years old. Similarly, the Tatmadaw’s law aimed to address national defense concerns, especially given Myanmar's strategic location between China and India.

Historically, China has invaded Myanmar six times, beginning in the Pagan era and continuing through the Qing Dynasty. In contrast, India has never invaded Myanmar. This historical context underscored China's perceived threat and justified the need for a robust national defense strategy.

The conscription law drafted in 1955 by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Brigadier General Thein Maung proposed three tiers of service:

1. Full-time Service: Men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27, serving 6 to 24 months.
2. Part-time Service: Men aged 18–45 and women aged 18–27, serving 30 days annually.
3. Specialized Service: Men aged 35–56 and women aged 27–35, serving 18 to 24 months.

This draft, however, required the approval of General Ne Win and Defense Minister U Ba Swe, as well as Prime Minister U Nu’s consent, all of which were initially withheld. It wasn’t until Ne Win’s caretaker government faced domestic conflict and Chinese Kuomintang aggression that the law was finally enacted in 1959.

The 1959 law was eventually replaced in 2010 under Senior General Than Shwe’s State Peace and Development Council with the “2010 Military Service Law.” Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has now reinstated this law, effectively reviving military conscription in Myanmar.

Thus, Myanmar has experienced two distinct military service laws under two different regimes: the People’s Military Service Law of the URC era and the Military Service Law of the State Peace and Development Council. Despite their shared focus on national defense, these laws were implemented under vastly different circumstances and principles, reflecting the evolving nature of Myanmar’s political and military landscape.

In 1959, when the Conscription Law was drafted, it was a time when the Myanmar military was still rebuilding its strength after key challenges. These included the desertion of battalions following independence in 1949, the escalation of civil war between 1948 and 1950, and the need to repel the Kuomintang invasion in 1950. While by 1959, the threat of Kuomintang incursions had waned, border tensions with China persisted. It was within this context of potential external aggression that the Conscription Law was introduced as a precautionary measure to bolster military capacity.

Fast forward to 2024, the enforcement of the Conscription Law appears to have taken on a markedly different context. The law is now being implemented in a post-2021 political landscape, marked by the military's refusal to transfer power to the winning party in the elections, the suppression of peaceful protests, and the rise of armed resistance movements opposing the military coup. These movements, including revolutionary groups and ethnic armed organizations, have inflicted significant losses on the military, both in terms of manpower and territorial control. The revival of the conscription law is seen as an attempt to address this manpower shortage.

Unlike the 1959 context, there is no credible external threat to justify the enforcement of conscription in 2024. Instead, the law appears to be primarily a mechanism for the military junta to maintain its grip on power. The military's actions have eroded trust among the people, leading many young individuals to flee conscription. Some join resistance groups, others leave the country under the guise of education, and many more seek employment opportunities in neighboring countries like Thailand and Malaysia.

The enforcement of the conscription law has had ripple effects. Employment agencies facilitating overseas jobs have seen increased demand, while more young people focus on studying abroad to avoid military service. In regions like Mae Sot and Chiang Mai in Thailand, the influx of Myanmar migrant workers has created an oversaturated labor market, making job acquisition increasingly difficult. This trend underscores a larger issue: many young people view Myanmar as an oppressive state where arbitrary rule and the junta's control make it unlivable.

The reluctance of youth to serve in the military stems from legitimate grievances. People are naturally attached to their homeland, and abandoning it indicates compelling reasons. For Myanmar's youth, the issue lies in being conscripted for an unjust war—not to defend the nation against external aggression but to fight fellow citizens, including ethnic minorities and resistance forces.

Moreover, the prospect of military service under the current regime is seen as a moral compromise. Many youths prefer to face societal shame rather than participate in what they perceive as an illegitimate cause. Some even turn to monastic life as an escape from conscription. Historical precedents, such as accounts from the Mahagandaryone Monastery, reveal similar patterns of conscientious objection during unjust conflicts. These stories emphasize the moral and ethical dilemmas faced by individuals coerced into fighting.

The junta’s motives in enforcing the conscription law stand in stark contrast to historical examples where military service was seen as a duty to defend the nation. Under current circumstances, the military’s actions are widely viewed as self-serving, aimed at prolonging its rule rather than protecting the country. The publication of nationalist poetry, such as "A Different Kind of War" by Taungdwinshin Ngein Mael, in military-backed outlets like The Myanmar Light, underscores the junta’s attempts to manipulate cultural narratives to justify its actions. However, the poem, originally written during a monarchist era, raises questions about its appropriateness in today's context.

Looking back through history, from the Konbaung Dynasty to the colonial period, conscription has always been an unpopular measure. The burden of war and forced service often fell disproportionately on ordinary citizens, fueling resentment and resistance. In the modern era, young people are even less inclined to participate in conflicts that lack moral legitimacy.

In conclusion, no one willingly serves in the military unless absolutely necessary. The necessity of conscription is deeply tied to the presence of justice, freedom, and equality in a nation. For Myanmar’s youth, the absence of these principles makes military service under the current regime wholly unappealing. If the military junta continues to cling to power without addressing the root causes of discontent, the nation will face further erosion of its human and social capital. The reputation of the military, once upheld by figures like the legendary Three Arrows, is now at risk of irreparable damage under the leadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.